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BASIC ISSUES IN CIVIL CONTEMPT
MYRON FINK*

"The punishment of Contempt is the basis of all legal procedure

.

.. "

Under the single term "contempt" are implied two dis-

tinct functions to be exercised by a court: enforcing courtroom
order 2 and enforcing judicial decrees. Our concern will be limited to
the enforcement by contempt of one kind of judicial decree, the
injunction, which is an in personam order directing a defendant to
act or refrain from acting in a specified way.' We will be most
interested in examining the sanctions used to produce action by
means of coercive fines or imprisonment, the so-called "civil contempt" sanctions.
Historically, the mainspring of Equity enforcement was the Chancellor's ability personally to constrain disobedience to his commands.4 Where imprisonment of a recalcitrant defendant proved to
be not all together a satisfactory way of enforcing obedience to their
decrees, the Chancellors brought additional pressure to bear through
fines, writs of assistance and writs of sequestration.'
*Professor of Law and Law Librarian, UNM School of Law.
1. Sir John Fox, The History of Contempt of Court 1 (1927). "As a practical matter,
without contempt power to put teeth in the court's order, jurisdictional power would be an
empty illusion." J. Dobbyn, Injunctions in a Nutshell 216 (1974).
2. This function may be further categorized as follows: disruption in court; obstruction
of the court's processes; perjury, forgery and alterations of records; symbolic acts; insult and
insolence, out-of-court publications. Dobbs, Contempt of Court; A Survey, 56 Corn. L. Rev.
183,186-220 (1971).
3. Some in personam court orders can be enforced by methods other than contempt. D.
Dobbs, Remedies 91-93 (1973). On the other hand, contempt enforcement is often available
to enforce certain extraordinary remedies developed out of law rather than equity. Id. at
111-112.
4. "[I]t was the.., sole machinery which the Chancellor had originally to command.
This was in early times well adapted, and usually adequate, to support the kind of litigation
which ordinarily occupied the Court in the fifteenth century, namely, petitions for relief
against force and fraud and the violent removal of a neighbor's landmark or even the
neighbor himself. The failure of the common law to maintain order and to enforce its orders
was partly due to the self-imposed restriction to pecuniary compensation, and partly to the
curious fact that the Courts of law exercised no direct control over the execution of their
decisions, which were often in effect, as in form, merely declaratory of right." D.E.C. Yale,
Lord Nottingham's Manual of Chancery Practice and "Prolegomena of Chancery and
Equity "(1965) in 0. Fiss, Injunctions 709-710 (1972).
5. Id. at 710-713. These sanctions mark a movement away from the exclusive reliance on
the in personam process in the sense that they were obtainable without first imprisoning the
defendant.
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The Chancellor's unique power to subject a defendant to punishment if he did not obey turned on the fiction that Equity did not
make or change law; it merely commanded the defendant's conscience to act.6 The early Lord Chancellors were ecclesiastic dignitaries exercising civil jurisdiction as Keepers of the King's Conscience. Chancery did no more than to coerce the will of a disobedient party until such time as he cooperated." The religious,

moralistic atmosphere and the degree of intimacy thus engendered

between Chancellor and litigant with its emphasis on duty, obedience
and conscience underlies our Anglo-American belief in responsibility

8
for contempt, an idea foreign to some other cultures. It explains
how a purely private litigation between parties in Equity may become, as soon as an injunction issues, a matter personal to the court;
how an act of disobedience to a court order is also felt as an act of

disrespect, perhaps as an insult to the court and one bordering on

obstruction of justice.9
To this double-edged nature of civil contempt must be added the
"historical" fact that civil contempt is not really contempt at all.
Criminal contempt, a power that was directed at offensive conduct
and which derived its criminality from the active interference with

the crown or its acting official agents, was classically understood to
be contempt. It corresponds to what we have already referred to as
the function of enforcing courtroom order. Historically, there was a
body of law labeled "contempt" and a distinct equitable procedural
device which was used to secure obedience to court orders, the socalled contempt in procedure. 1 0
6. The fiction was invented by the Chancellors to rationalize the continued existence of a
Court of Chancery independent of the common law courts. Jurisdictional jealousy, friction
and irritations caused by the issuance of injunctions to stop proceedings in the common law
court and by the lack of hard rules by which a person in Equity could measure his rights
were allayed by the argument that Equity acted only to keep the law intact by making
personal orders to the defendant. The defendant is ordered to use the law in a particular
way under pain of personal imprisonment -nothing more.
7. The aim of the civil contempt sanction is to provoke cooperation from the contemnor
and not simply to get him to forebear other people's actions. The judge jailing a reluctant
party engages in an active struggle with the will of the latter and, as soon as the party
changes his attitude, he is freed.
8. See, e.g., Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Political Ideology: A Comparative Study, 41
Mich. L. Rev. 665 (1943). "It does not occur to the actors [parties before a Latin court]
that you have to bow to the judge's will, or that you may be punished by him, or even more
absurd, blamed for not having complied with his orders." Id. at 668.
9. Such act, while ordinarily considered civil, may become criminal if carried to the point
of "contumacy." Kreplik v. Couch Patent Co., 190 F. 565 (1st Cir. 1911); Bessette v. W. B.
Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904). The location of this point in terms of particular acts
of contempt is virtually impossible.
10. The original law of contempt embraced only what is now known as criminal contempt. See generally R. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power 42-50 (Anchor ed. 1971).
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Originally it appears that the contempt power was regarded as a
means of vindicating the court's authority by punishment in the
form of an unconditional fine or imprisonment. However, the same

act which is contemptuous of the court may have the effect of
impairing the remedy of an adverse party. As a consequence, there
gradually developed the concept of using the contempt power in aid

of the remedy, either by the use of a conditional fine or conditional
imprisonment or the assessment of a fine payable in whole or in part

to the complaining party, thus giving rise to the concept of civil, as

distinguished from criminal, contempt. (Emphasis added)' 1
At this point, we can begin to appreciate the difficulty inherent in
distinguishing civil and criminal contempt. All true contempt derives
from some offense to the law even though it may also impair the
remedy of an adverse party. Contempts cannot be wholly civil or
altogether criminal. And "it may not always be easy to classify a
particular act as belonging to either one of these two classes. It may
partake of the characteristics of both."' 2 It has been said that it is
not only impractical to distinguish every act of contempt in terms of
its civil and criminal nature, but, that "any further distinction between law as an official body or proceeding and law as manifested
through some private participant to a legal proceeding becomes hazy
and imbedded in insubstantial reasoning. "13
Difficulties of classification notwithstanding, the approach of the
judiciary both in England and America has been to separate civil
from criminal contempt.'" The dichotomy was officially born with
the initial separation of civil and criminal contempt for purposes of
review' s with the final step of separation taken in Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co.'

6

in 1911. Reversing a sentence which imposed a

fixed term of imprisonment for violation of a labor injunction, the
Supreme Court in Gompers denied the power of the Federal Court to
punish for criminal contempt in a civil proceeding on the grounds
11. Wright, Bryne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, Cvil and Criminal Contempt in the
Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167 (1955) (Report by Special Comm. Jun. Barristers of L.A. Bar
Assoc.). See also Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt of Court, 46 Yale L.J. 326 (1936);
Comment, Civil and CriminalContempt in the Federal Courts, 57 Yale L.J. 83 (1947).
12. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904).
13. R. Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 49.
14. See Comment, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, supra note 11, at
90 n. 49.
15. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904). In order to arrive at the ruling in
this case, the Supreme Court found it necessary to classify the contempt involved and it
proceeded to do so according to whether the aim of the contempt was to punish a wrong to
the court or to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties.
16. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
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that prejudice to certain rights of the criminal contemnor might

result.1'

There was ... a variance between the procedure adopted and the
punishment imposed .... The result was as fundamentally erroneous
as if in an action of "A. v. B. for assault and battery," the judgment
entered had been that the defendant be confined in prison for twelve
months. s

Gompers thus stated a cardinal principal limiting the sanctions available to a judge in a contempt case: a determinate "criminal" type
sanction cannot be imposed where the trial procedure has not given
the defendant the benefit of criminal due process. Here, the court
reasoned from the procedure used: criminal safeguards were not

afforded and hence the case must have been civil, permitting only a
civil-type penalty.' 9
The Court in Gompers had also to determine whether the contempt involved was civil and could consequently be reconsidered on
2 0 As a result, it felt obliged to
the merits of the record as a whole.

develop a rule of legal consequences for classifying contempts based

on the character and purpose of punishment. Because of its great
impact on the subsequent development of the law of contempt, the
Court's words deserve to be quoted in full:
It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases.
If it is for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the
benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the
sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court. It is true
that punishment by imprisonment may be remedial as well as punitive, and many civil contempt proceedings have resulted not only in
the imposition of a fine, payable to the complainant, but also in
committing the defendant to prison. But imprisonment for civil con17. Id. at 444. "If then, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, the sentence was wholly
punitive, it could have been properly imposed only in a proceeding instituted and tried as
[T] here are some differences between the two classes of profor criminal contempt ....
ceedings which involve substantial rights and constitutional privileges. Without deciding
what may be the rule in civil contempt, it is certain that in proceedings for criminal
contempt the defendant is presumed to be innocent, he must be proved to be guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, and cannot be compelled to testify against himself."
18. Id. at 449.
19. The court could have reasoned just as well from the nature of the sentence. The
sentence was determinate and hence criminal; therefore, the procedure used must satisfy the
requirements for criminal procedure.
20. If the proceeding was one at law for criminal contempt, rather than one in Equity for
civil contempt where the whole record below may be examined on appeal, the findings of
fact by the trial judge would have to be treated as conclusive and the appeal limited solely
to questions of law.
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tempt is ordered where the defendant has refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order which, either in form
or substance, was mandatory in its character. Imprisonment in such
cases is not inflicted as a punishment, but is intended to be remedial
by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do. The
degree in such cases is that the defendant stand committed unless
and until he performs the affirmative act required by the court's
order.
On the other hand, if the defendant does that which he has been
commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accomplished.
Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done, nor
afford any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the
disobedience. If the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period, the defendant is furnished no key, and he cannot
shorten the term by promising not to repeat the offense. Such
imprisonment operates not as a remedy coercive in its nature, but
solely as punishment for the completed act of disobedience.
It is true that either form of imprisonment has also an incidental
effect. For if the case is civil and the punishment is purely remedial,
there is also a vindication of the court's authority. On the other
hand, if the proceeding is for criminal contempt and the imprisonment is soley punitive, to vindicate the authority of the law, the
complainant may also derive some incidental benefit from the fact
that such punishment tends to prevent a repetition of the disobedience. But such indirect consequences will not change imprisonment which is merely coercive and remedial, into that which is solely
punitive in character, or vice versa.
The distinction between refusing to do an act commandedremedied by imprisonment until the party performs the required act;
and doing an act forbidden, punished by imprisonment for a definite
term; is sound in principle, and generally, if not universally, affords a
test by which to determine the character of the punishment. 2 1
Most clear in this role is that punishment was to be the fulcrum
upon which to balance and distinguish the two kinds of contempt.2 2
21. 221 U.S. at 441-443. The quotation is preceded by a statement recognizing contempts as neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal.
Later courts have not been controlled by the statements in Gompers which say that a
contempt is "civil" where the defendant has refused to do an affirmative act required by an
order, but that if he violated a negative order, the contempt is criminal. All that this
statement means is that where a defendant has refused to do an ordered act, his imprisonment would ordinarily be coercive to make him do what he is refusing to do. On the other
hand, where defendant has done an act he was ordered not to do, imprisonment ordinarily
cannot undo the act or afford compensation to the plaintiff.
22. The nature of the punishment test falls short in that it does not determine the
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In many ways as significant for the future, especially the later developments of the law of civil contempt, the statement provided the
rationale that punishment for civil contempt is not really punishment
since the party imprisoned can control his incarceration by doing the
required act.2 3 Thus, the effectiveness of the coercion (where coercive
relief by fine or imprisonment is made conditional upon the failure of
the contemnor to purge himself) was made to reflect directly the
power of the courts to administer justice. The result was that the
Supreme Court committed itself to an approach which clearly recognized a separation of civil from criminal contempt; a separation
which was to be used, not only to limit the prerogative of the offended court, but to do so without impairing the remedy of the
offended party. After Gompers a judge was limited in his contempt
sanction in two ways: he could not impose a coercive type sanction
where there was nothing to coerce and he could not impose a determinate type sanction where the trial procedure had not given the
defendant the benefit of criminal due process. In most American
jurisdictions the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is
made with reasonable sharpness today. The polar concepts of the
"remedial" versus "punitive" remain the dividing line between civil
and criminal contempt. 2 4 Much that goes to the heart of an accused
contemnor's liberty and property rights depends upon the labeling of
a contemptuous act. We may, for example, begin with the difference
in punishment permitted by each class and note that civil contempt
punishment could conceivably continue without end while criminal
punishment is limited.
The law has fixed standards for each remedy, and they are neither

identical nor congealable. They are, for damages in civil contempt,
the amount of injury proven and no more ...; for coercion, what

may be required to bring obedience and not more, whether by way

of imprisonment or fine; for punishment, what is not cruel and

to advise the responcorrect classification for the one purpose for which it is most needed:
Justice Rutledge in
surprisingly,
Not
him.
against
case
the
of
nature
the
of
dent at the outset
United Mine
a dissenting opinion written over thirty-five years later in United States v.
Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), stated: "This case is characteristic of the long-existing
things, in that
confusion concerning contempt and the manner of their trial, among other
civil or
whether
proceeding,
the
of
character
and
nature
the
of
question
the
most frequently
as in
and
be
should
it
as
than,
rather
review
of
stage
criminal, is determined as its end in the
the complete
my opinion it must be, at the beginning.... And this fact in itself illustrates
remains unknown
jeopardy in which rights are placed when the nature of the proceeding
368.
at
Id.
review."
on
action
final
the
until
and unascertainable
own
23. This is now the famous cliche that civil contemnors carry the keys to their
prison door.
24. Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Ovil and Criminal, 43 Col. L. Rev. 7.80, 823
(1943).
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unusual or, in the case of a fine, excessive within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition. And for determining excessiveness of criminal
fines there are analogies from legislative action which in my opinion
2
are controlling. (Emphasis added.) 1
A short hand way to describe these most important consequences
of
making the civil-contempt classification is to restate the
rule that if a
contempt procedure is criminal in nature, the sentence
must be a
determinate one, while if it is civil in nature, the sentence
must be
coercive.
The different procedural treatment afforded a contempt
depending upon its classification as civil or criminal is most striking.
This is
not surprising since, as every student of law is aware, the
procedures
to be followed in criminal proceedings and in civil ones
mark one of
the great constitutional divides. A whole system of criminal
safeguards comes into play once a contempt is classed as criminal. 2 6
The burden of proof is on the prosecution, the party charged
cannot
be required to testify against himself, cannot be put
in double
jeopardy, and cannot be tried without appropriate notice
of the
charge. Inferentially at least, he is entitled to counsel and
compulsory process for bringing in his witnesses. He is now entitled
to a
jury trial if the criminal sentence is a potentially serious one.
As with
other crimes, intent is an element of criminal contempt, and
it must
be proven before criminal punishment can be inflicted ....
The classification of a contempt hearing as a criminal one may also
affect the
right of appeal or the route that an appeal takes. At least
in some
criminal contempt cases, the state should be a party to any
appeal
proceedings. The criminal classification will also invoke the
pardoning power of the state .... (Footnotes omitted.) 2 7
25. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,
377 (1947) (dissenting opinion). The term "punishment" is used in this statement
to define the remedial goal of
criminal contempt and is contrasted with the remedial goal
of civil contempt: coercion and
compensation. Compare this to use of the same term as the
test to distinguish between civil
and criminal contempt: "It is not the fact of punishment
but rather its character and
purpose that often serve to distinguish between the two
classes of cases." Gompers, 221
U.S. at 441. Sometimes the term "punishment" is found to
exist (or not to exist) solely by
reason of definition, e.g., since civil contempt is not a criminal
proceeding, punishment is
not involved. Compare this with recognition in Gompers that
contempts are neither wholly
civil nor altogether criminal because the sanctions may have
incidental effects. Confusion
can be avoided by remembering that judges and writers use
"punishment" in one or more of
these contexts.
26. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 364 n. 30 (dissenting
opinion).
27. Dobbs, supra note 2, at 242-243.
In addition, a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding
is surrounded by a presumption of innocence, United States v. Fleishman, 339 U.S. 349
(1950), and is protected by the
fact that the act complained of must be established beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure are applicable to criminal contempt
proceedings, but they are
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protecWith legal consequences as important as these procedural
"criminal,"
as
contempt
a
of
classification
tions depending upon
for a test
pressure rapidly mounted in the years following Gompersof the case
the nature
that would advise a respondent at the outset of
Procedure were
2
Criminal
of
Rules
Federal
In 1946,
against him.
the contemnor of
adopted which included a requirement of notice to
prosecuthe nature of the contempt charge in all criminal contemptsomewhat
been
tions. 2 9 However, the salutary effect of this rule has United Mine
v.
States
United
in
decision
later
blunted by the

contempt could be
Workers3 0 which held that civil and criminal
provided defendants
prosecuted in a single contempt proceeding
af-

protections
enjoyed during the trial itself all of the enhanced
forded in criminal contempt proceedings.'

1

States, 173 F.2d 865 (9th Cir.
not applicable to civil proceedings. Alexander v. United
1949).
as well. "Any fine levied is
There are some important disadvantages for the party charged
contempt for violating
criminal
in
held
be
not discharged in bankruptcy. Moreover he may
to vindicate judicial power even
important
be
may
it
since
reversed
later
is
that
order
an
same principle applies when the
when it is erroneously exercised. In at least some cases, this
contempt sentence may stand
criminal
a
and
matter
subject
court lacks jurisdiction of the
243.
at
2,
note
supra
even though there was no jurisdiction." Dobbs,
214-215 (2d Cir. 1935),
28. In McCann v. New York Stock Exch., 80 F.2d 211,
whether a contempt
outset
the
at
distinguishing
for
formula
a
prescribed
Judge L. Hand
can be detercharacter
criminal
the
formula,
simple
a
As
criminal.
proceeding was civil or
But there are
court.
the
by
or
States
United
the
by
mined by the fact of prosecution either
one of the parties, as he may do. In
cases in which the judge prefers to use the attorney of
to tell whether the prosecution is a
such a case, it is often difficult for the respondent
the proceeding. The criminal nature
to
party
private
a
of
behalf
on
remedial move taken
an order directing the attorney to
entering
judge's
the
could, however, be made plain by
and by attaching a copy of the
prosecute the defendant criminally on behalf of the court,
prosecution must be deemed to be
the
done,
was
this
unless
that
felt
Hand
Judge
process.
civil.
state the time and place
29. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b). "The notice shall
the defense, and shall state the
of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for preparation of
and describe it as such." (Emessential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged
added.)
phasis
of the Court held that
30. 330 U.S. 258 (1947). In United Mine Workers, a majority
resulted in substantial prejudice
Rule 42(b) is satisfied if failure to give such notice "has not
to the defendant." Id. at 298.
allthe rights and privileges
31. Id. at 298-301. "If the defendants were thus accorded
in no better position to
put
are
they
cases,
contempt
owing to defendants in criminal
contempt and was carried on in
complain because their trial included a proceeding in civil
conduct can amount to both civil
the main equity suit. Common sense would recognize that
in resorting to coercive and to
court
a
justify
may
acts
same
The
and criminal contempt.
in a single proceeding would
contempt
the
of
aspects
both
punitive measures. Disposing of
better practice to try criminal
seem at least a convenient practice. . . . Even if it be the
in any manner, a mingling
contempt alone and so avoid obscuring the defendant's privileges
to result in substanshown
be
nevertheless
must
proceedings
contempt
of civil and criminal
omitted).
(Footnotes
298-300
at
Id.
required."
be
tial prejudice before a reversal will
nature of the double proceeding
The Court said further: "In so far as the criminal
the criminal trial are not diluted by the
dominates and in so far as the defendants' rights in
is prejudice avoided. Here,... all
extent
that
to
contempt,
criminal
mixing of civil with
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The United Mine Workers case arose out of a dispute between
the
United States and the United Mine Workers regarding the
unilateral
right of the union to terminate a contract between them
under an
existing labor act regulating coal wage agreements. The
union and
Lewis, its President, defied an injunction of the federal district
court
and were both found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of civil and
criminal contempt. Unconditional fines were imposed
on Lewis in
the amount of $10,000 and on the union in the
amount of
$3,500,000. The Supreme Court on review found that
the
ings in the trial court supported judgments for both criminal proceedand civil
contempt. The majority of the Court felt, however, that
the fine of
$3,500,000 against the union was excessive and modified
require the defendant union to pay an unconditionalit so as to
fine of
$700,000 and to further pay an additional fine of $2,800,000
contingent upon union compliance with the court order.
Justice Rutledge, in a biting dissent, took issue not only
with the
"idea that a criminal prosecution and a civil suit for
damages or
equitable relief could be hashed together in a single criminal-civil
hodgepodge"'I but also with the "mixing civil remedies
and criminal
punishments in one lumped form of relief, indistinguishably
compounding them and thus putting both in unlimited judicial
discretion, with no possibility of applying any standard of measurement
on
review." 3"
That the Government is complainant here, both as "employer"seeking remedial relief and in sovereign capacity seeking to vindicate
the

court's authority by criminal penalty, does not nullify all these longestablished limitations or put the courts wholly at large, limited
by
nothing except their unconfimed discretion as to the scope and character of the relief allowable. Power there is to take adequate
mea-

sures when violation is clearly shown and adequate proof is made
to
sustain them. For proven violation, criminal penalty within the
Eighth Amendment's limits as we would measure similar impositions
placed by Congress, at the most; for damages proven and found, civil
award commensurate with the finding; and for coercion, civil
relief

rights and privileges of the defendants were fully respected,
and there has been no showing
of substantial prejudice flowing from the formal peculiarities
of defendants' trial." Id. at
300-301 (Footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 364.
33. Id. at 365. "As the proceeding itself is said to have
been both civil and criminal, so
are the two 'fines.' Each was imposed in a single lump
sum, with no allocation of specific
portions as among civil damages, civil coercion and criminal
punishment. The Government
concedes that some part of each 'fine' was laid for each
purpose. But the trial court did not
state, and the Government has refused to speculate,
how much was imposed in either
instance for each of those distinct remedial functions."
Id. at 376-77.
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case contingent
by way of imprisonment or "fine," but in either
and for termicompurgation
for
only, not final, giving opportunity
future. (Footthe
for
penalty
further
of
made,
being
its
nation, on
34
note omitted.)

an usurpation
Finally, there was, in the view of Justice Rutledge,
case.
this
in
Court
of the function of the District
the first. instance to
[I] t is the District Court's function, not ours, in

for coercive
fix the amounts of criminal fines. In equity proceedings
revise and
to
power
have
one
this
including
relief, appellate courts
sought to
are
also
damages
if
and
purposes,
such
for
fix awards
with the
consistency
for
review amounts awarded for this purpose
at law even in
proof. ....But in a criminal proceeding which is
to fix the fine
instance
first
the
in
not
is
contempt, . •.our function
We can only
....
Court's.
District
the
is
function
That
ourselves.

under the
determine whether those imposed by 3it are excessive
"
omitted.)
Eighth Amendment. (Citations
by Justice RutFor all of the reasons elucidated in the dissent
case must be
Workers
ledge, the majority opinion in the United Mine
Court
Supreme
States
regarded as unfortunate. No case in the United

and penalhad ever before sustained such conglomerate proceedings
What is
magnitude.
such
ties, much less a criminal contempt fine of
prosecuthe
sanctioned
most clear in this case is that the Court had
criminal contion in a single contempt proceeding of both civil and
penalties
criminal
and
civil
tempt. The rule in Gompers that not only
and
different
altogether
but also civil and criminal proceedings are
not
was
so,
kept
be
must
separate things, and under the Constutition
3 6 However one regards the decifollowed in United Mine Workers.
34. Id. at 380-81.
imposed by the District Court as
35. Id. at 384. The Supreme Court revised the penalties
but was made wholly criminal (thus
follows: Lewis' composite fine was affirmed in amount
the union's composite fine was
in effect increasing the amount of the criminal imposition);
and a conditional penalty of
$700,000
of
fine
criminal
flat
a
by
held excessive and replaced
for civil damages by the
award
possible
any
coercion;
$2,800,000 said to be entirely for civil
lower court was eliminated. Id. at 382.
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 299: "Rule
36. See notes 29, 30 & 31, supra, and United
of the criminal aspects of the case,
recognition
and
42(b), while demanding fair notice
of the remedial aspects of the concontains nothing precluding a simultaneous disposition
v. New York Stock Exch., 80 F.2d
McCann
in
opinion
Hand's
L.
Judge
Cf.
tried."
tempt
steps are taken to avoid possible
certain
unless
that
(suggesting
1935)
Cir.
211, 214-215 (2d
prosecution must be deemed to
"the
proceedings,
contempt
and
confusion between criminal
See also note 28, supra.
punishment").
be civil and will support no other than remedial
as in United Mine Workers, the
when,
multiplied
are
confusion
for
possibilities
The
States is a party, since the United States
contempt is instituted in a suit in which the United
McCrone v. United States, 307
proceedings.
contempt
may bring civil as well as criminal
Mine Workers: "Here the right
United
in
dissent
U.S. 61 (1939). Cf.also Justice Rutledge's
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sion in United Mine Workers, there can be little question that it
allows "vast liberality" concerning matters of procedure and relief in
contempt proceedings.' '
There was also in United Mine Workers an opinion by Justices
Black and Douglas, concurring in part and dissenting in part, which
emphasized an aspect of the case of much significance for the law of
civil contempt. Noting that the contempt citation in this case had as
its purpose the "vindication of the District Court's authority against
a continuing defiance," and that the "legitimate 'end purposed' was
affirmative action by the defendants to prevent interruption of coal
production pending final adjudication of the controversy," ' 8 they
concluded that a conditional civil sanction would have brought about
at least as prompt and unequivocal obedience to the court's order as
would the criminal punishment for past disobedience imposed by the
majority in the case.' I This being the case, they argued that the
conditional civil sanction was proper under the general rule that "in
contempt proceedings courts should never exercise more than 'the
least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' "40
In certain circumstances criminal contempt culminating in unconditional punishment for past disobedience may well constitute an exercise of "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."
Thus in situations which would warrant only a use of coercive sanctions in the first instance, criminal punishment might be appropriate
'to know that it was a charge, and not a suit' comprehended all other procedural rights in
the trial and appellate courts. Without this, none could be asserted or maintained. The
denial of that right, deferring it until the decision here is handed down, is in my opinion not
only a denial of all, it is a violation both of the Constitution and of Rule 42(b)." 330 U.S.
at 376.
37. See Penfield Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 587, 602 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., concurring).

38. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 333.
39. They gave still another important reason: "We think it significant that the conduct
which was prohibited by the restraining order for violation of which these defendants have
been punished for contempt is also punishable under the War Labor Disputes Act. That Act
provides a maximum punishment of $5,000 fine and one year imprisonment for those who
interfere with the operation of mines taken over by the United States. Had the defendants
been tried under that statute, their punishment would have been limited thereby and in
their trial they would have enjoyed all the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights."
Id. at 334. Justice Rutledge in his dissent likewise found the flat $700,000 criminal fine
against the defendant union to be excessive by constitutional and statutory standards for
the same reasons: "In my opinion, when Congress prescribes a maximum penalty for criminal violation of a statute, that penalty fixes the maximum which can be imposed whether
the conviction is in a criminal proceeding as such for its violation or is for contempt for
violating an order of court to observe it temporarily. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S.
604, 612." Id. at 382.
40. Id. at 332 (citing as authority Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821)
and In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945)).
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persist in disobeying the
at a later stage if the defendant should
41
order of the court. (Emphasis added.)

A reading of the Black-Douglas opinion suggests additional reasons
influencing their choice of the civil contempt sanction in this case.
Defendants did not receive a jury trial in the contempt proceedings 2 raising at least a question as to whether the constitutional
requisites for criminal contempt punishment had been met in this
case. 43 But there appeared to be no question with regard to the
procedure for coercing obedience:
We agree that the court had power summarily to coerce obedience to
those orders and to subject defendants to such conditional sanctions
as were necessary to compel obedience. And we agree that in such
civil contempt proceedings to compel obedience, it was not necessary for the court to abide by all the procedural safeguards which
surround trial for crime.4 1

Moreover, the coercive power carried its own resolution, making
what would otherwise be an excessive fine now quite reasonable.
The situation of grave emergency facing the country when the
District Court acted called for the strongest measures-measures designed to produce quick and unqualified obedience of the court's
order. If the $10,000 fine on defendant Lewis and the $3,500,000
41. 330 U.S. at 333. Elsewhere Black and Douglas make clear that the circumstances of
the case called for quick action by the court to coerce future obedience by these defendants. Defendants had disobeyed a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
and were threatening to change the status quo so that no effective judgment could be
rendered. Another circumstance thought relevant in determining whether criminal punishment or coercive sanction should be employed was that the defendants, though acting
wilfully, believed in good faith that they were acting legally in a case involving difficult
questions of law. Cited as precedent was Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925),
where it was said that "the intention with which acts of contempt have been committed
must necessarily and properly have an important bearing on the degree of guilt and the
penalty which should be imposed." Id. at 538.
42. "Defendants have not argued either in the District Court or in this Court that they
are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. And they expressly waived in open court whatever rights they had to an advisory jury." 330 U.S. at 367 n. 34 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
"[D]efendants ... urge only their right to a jury trial as provided in Sect. 11 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. But Sect. 11 is not operative here, for it applies only to cases 'arising
under this Act,' and we have already held that the restrictions upon injunctions imposed by
the Act do not govern this case." Id. at 298 (majority opinion).
43. The opinion by Justices Black and Douglas expressly avoided the constitutional
requisites of criminal contempt punishment in this case, Id. at 328, and Justice Rutledge in
his dissent states: "It does not matter that some of those [procedural protections thrown
about all other criminal prosecutions] which incontestably are applicable may not have
been put in issue or preserved for review in this case. The question cuts more deeply than
the application of any specific guaranty. It affects the right to insist upon or have the
benefit of any." Id. at 367-68.
44. Id. at 330.
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fine on the defendant union be treated as coercive fines, they would
not necessarily be excessive. For they would be payable only if the
defendants continued to disobey the court's order. Defendants could

then avoid payment by purging themselves. 45

The Black-Douglas opinion is instructive for the light it sheds on
the appeal of the civil contempt sanction to the judicial mind. Often
necessary and appropriate, the coercive remedy of civil contempt
manages to avoid most procedural difficulties attached to the criminal law. At the same time, it offers possibilities for imaginative application which we shall have occasion to investigate later in this
writing.
In the same term as United Mine Workers, but subsequent to its
decision, the Supreme Court heard an appeal in the case of Penfield
Company v. Securities & Exchange Commission.4 6 The Commission
had subpoenaed one Young, an officer of Penfield, to produce certain books and records in connection with an investigation then
being conducted of the corporation. Upon Young's refusal to comply
with the subpoena, the Commission sought coercive enforcement of
its subpoena by instituting a contempt proceeding in the United
States District Court. The court refused to grant the coercive relief
designed to force Young to comply but found Young in contempt
and imposed upon him a flat, unconditional fine of $50. The defendants did not receive notice that they were being charged with a
criminal contempt as required by Rule 42(b). The Commission
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals challenging as error
the imposition of the unconditional fine when what it had asked for
was a form of coercive relief. The appellate court reversed, agreeing
that it was error to impose a criminal penalty in a civil contempt
proceeding, and directed that Young be imprisoned until he produced the documents.4 7
45. Id. at 335. After reiterating the Gompers view that judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper case, be employed both to coerce the defendant into
compliance with the court's order and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained,
the majority laid down these general standards: "Where compensation is intended, a fine is
imposed, payable to the complainant. Such fine must of course be based upon evidence of
complainant's actual loss, and his right, as a civil litigant, to the compensatory fine is
dependent upon the outcome of the basic controversy. But where the purpose is to make
the defendant comply, the court's discretion is otherwise exercised. It must then consider
the character and the magnitude of the harm threatened by the continued contumacy, and
the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired. It
is a corollary of the above principles that a court which has returned a conviction for
contempt must, in fixing the amount of a fine to be imposed as a punishment or as a means
of securing future compliance, consider the amount of the defendant's financial resources
and the consequent seriousness of the burden to that particular defendant." Id. at 304.
46. 330 U.S. 585 (1947).
47. 157 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1946).
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The majority opinion written by Justice Douglas upheld the view

of the circuit court of appeals.4 8 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Rutledge agreed that the rule in Gompers required the action by the

court of appeals but wondered "why both the criminal fine imposed
by the District Court and the civil relief given by the Circuit Court of
Appeals should not be allowed to stand" in view of the mixed proceeding without regard to the requirements of 42(b) permitted by
the United Mine Workers decision. 4 9 He felt, however, that the char-

acter and scope of relief should have been left, in the first instance,
for the district court, rather than the court of appeals.
There was in Penfield a dissent by Justice Frankfurter

0

taking

issue sharply with the majority on the question of the trial court's
allowable discretion in regulatory subpoena enforcement.' I The last
paragraph in the dissent deserves to be quoted in full.
48. 330 U.S. 585 (1947). An interesting fact in the case is that Young did not appeal
from the order holding him in contempt and subjecting him to a fine but instead paid the
fine and argued on appeal that the circuit court of appeals was without authority to
substitute another penalty or to add to the one already imposed and satisfied. He rested his
argument on 18 U.S.C. §401 (1971) which gives the federal courts power to punish by fine
or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority. Since the
statute provides alternative penalties, once a contemnor pays a criminal penalty, his sentence may not thereafter be amended so as to provide for imprisonment.
Justice Douglas responded as follows: "We assume, arguendo, that the statute allowing
fine or imprisonment governs civil as well as criminal contempt proceedings. If the statute is
so construed, we find in it no barrier to the imposition of both a fine as a punitive exaction
and imprisonment as a coercive sanction, or vice versa. That practice has been approved ....
When the court imposes a fine as a penalty, it is punishing yesterday's contemptuous
conduct. When it adds the coercive sanction of imprisonment, it is announcing the consequences of tomorrow's contumacious conduct. At least in that situation the offenses are not
the same. And the most that the statute forbids is the imposition of both fine and imprisonment for the same offense." Id. at 594.
49. Id. at 602. "I find it difficult ... to reconcile the action taken here with what was
done in the Mine Workers decision. A majority there held, as I thought contrary to the
Gompers ruling, that civil and criminal contempt could be prosecuted in a single contempt
proceeding conducted according to the rules of procedure applicable in equity causes, and
that both types of relief, civil and criminal, could be imposed in such a mixed proceeding."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 601.
What Justice Rutledge does not say is that, in the view of the majority of the court,
defendants in United Mine Workers were fully informed that a criminal contempt was being
charged and enjoyed during the trial itself all the enhanced protections accorded defendants
in criminal contempt proceedings. Thus, while Justice Rutledge is technically correct that
the trial included a proceeding in civil contempt and was carried on in the main equity suit,
there was no general holding that the rules of procedure applicable in equity cases were
sufficient to support criminal contempt convictions.
It is possible, therefore, to distinguish Gompers from United Mine Workers while at the
same time placing the Penfield decision in a direct line with Gompers. Both in Gompers and
in Penfield, a criminal contempt penalty was imposed in a civil contempt proceeding without knowledge to the defendant that a charge was pending and without proper criminal
procedural safeguards.
50. Id. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., & Jackson, J., dissenting).
51. Justice Douglas felt the courts were obligated under the Securities Act of 1933 to
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The question, then, is whether the Court could impose what constituted a fine for criminal contempt, that is, to vindicate the law as
such, without a formal pleading charging Young with such disobedience. We do not think Judge Hall had to direct the clerk to
issue an attachment against Young to inform him of that which he
obviously knew and which the proceedings had made abundantly
clear to him. The true significance of our opinion in United States v.
United Mine Workers ... , as we understand it, is that contempt
proceedings are sui generis and should be treated as such in their
practical incidence. They are not to be circumscribed by procedural
formalities, or by traditional limitations of what are ordinarily called
crimes, except insofar as due process of law and other standards of
decency and fairness in the administration of federal justice may
require. On this record we find not the faintest denial of any safeguard or of appropriate procedural protection. (Emphasis added.) 2
The above language appears to indicate that 42(b) notice that a
criminal contempt is pending is unnecessary as are the usual safeguards of a criminal trial provided the hearing is a fair and open one.
The implication is that a contemnor obviously knows what punishments are possible and therefore is on notice. If this is the true
significance of the United Mine Workers case, then we may fairly say
that the federal courts have repudiated this view in recent years.

Beginning with United States v. Barnett' I in 1964 and finally with
Bloom v. Illinois"4 in 1968, the federal view has been that criminal
contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense since it is a violation of the
law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both. The consequence is that all of the usual procedural safeguards
grant the full remedial relief which the Act placed behind the orders of the Commission in
the absence of certain findings: that the Commission's request had become moot, that the
documents produced satisfied its legitimate needs, or that the additional ones sought were
irrelevant to its statutory functions. Justice Frankfurter favored more judicial discretion in
the matter in view of the Congressional policy that courts "were not to be automata
carrying out the wishes of the administrative" and because the record on appeal disclosed
circumstances at the time enforcement was sought making coercive enforcement inappropriate. Id. at 604.
52. Id. at 609.
53. 376 U.S. 681 (1964). In Barnett the Court indicated that the question whether a
severe criminal contempt punishment would itself trigger the right to a jury trial had not
been firmly settled by prior cases and that some members of the Court believed that the
Constitution limited the punishment which could be imposed in a criminal contempt where
the contempt was tried without a jury. Id. at 694-695, 695 n. 12.
54. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). "[S]erious contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes
that they are subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution, now binding on the
States .... " Id. at 198. "Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt,
except that committed in open court, requires that the accused shall be advised of the
charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation.
We think this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses
to give testimony .... "Id. at 205.
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required by the United States Constitution in criminal proceedings
also surround proceedings in criminal contempt including the right to

jury trial for serious crimes. 5
Interestingly, while a virtual revolution in procedure has transformed the law of criminal contempt during the last decade, little has
changed in the procedures for civil contempt. As early as 1955,

arguments for a unitary procedure and the abolishing of distinctions
between criminal and civil contempt were resisted on the grounds
that the traditional safeguards then available in criminal contempt
were unnecessary in civil contempt proceedings and on the further

ground that justice to the private litigant in a civil contempt proceeding required that his burden be no greater than in the civil proceeding
5
which gave rise to his right in the first place. 6 On the other hand, a

leading authority has felt that civil contempt procedure should not
be reformed but that rather the entire power abolished as an anomoly in our law.5 I

It will not be our purpose to make a critical assessment of the law

of civil contempt. Rather we will briefly survey the types of sanctions that have been developed in our recent legal history and point

up a few of the major problems arising from the use of the civil
contempt sanction.
CIVIL CONTEMPT SANCTIONS

The definitive statement on the sanctions available for civil contempt remains that of the Court in United Mine Workers:
Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper
case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the
defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses sustained.' s
55. The Court in Bloom explicitly refused to make an exception to the rule for disorders
in the courtroom although recognizing that the power of a judge to quell disturbance cannot
attend upon the impaneling of a jury. "The goals of dispatch, economy, and efficiency are
important, but they are amply served by preserving the power to commit for civil contempt
and by recognizing that many contempts are not serious crimes but petty offenses not
within the jury trial provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 209.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) provides that "a criminal contempt may be
punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the
contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court." According to the
court in Bloom, "[t] his rule reflects the common-law rule which is widely if not uniformly
followed in the States. Although Rule 42(a) is based in part on the premise that it is not
necessary specially to present the facts of a contempt which occurred in the very presence
of the judge, it also rests on the need to maintain order and a deliberative atmosphere in the
courtroom." 391 U.S. at 209-10.
56. See Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 11, at 180-81.
57. R. Goldfarb, supra note 10. See generally Id. at 26-75.
58. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04 (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 448 (1911)).
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Civil contempt to coerce compliance is usually accomplished by

the sanction of conditional fine or imprisonment.' I It is limited by

two principles: the respondent must be able to comply with the
conditional order6 0 and he may not be imprisoned for debt.6 1 Civil
contempt to compensate for losses sustained due to contemptuous
conduct is usually accomplished by way of an unconditional fine

payable to the petitioner.6 2 It should be remembered that, although

59. As an alternative to conditional fine or imprisonment to coerce compliance, it is
highly likely that courts will support the conditional denial of some of the normal rights or
privileges of litigation such as striking pleadings, refusing to permit appeals, or otherwise
limiting one's participation in a trial while one remains in contempt. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2); United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, of Enerjol Double Strength, 265 F.2d
332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332
F.2d 602 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 912 (1965). In recent years, innovative forms of
coercive civil
contempt sanctions have been approved by federal courts opening up new
possibilities for the development of coercive sanctions. Like the conditional denial of some
of the rights of litigation, these new sanctions would deprive a violator of his holding public
office, Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 924 (1966),
or of receiving public funds, Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cit. 1972), until
such time as court orders were obeyed or complied with.
60. Application of McCausland, 130 Cal. App. 2d 708, 279 P.2d 820 (1955). In that
case, respondent had failed to obey a court order to pay a sum of money to petitioner. In a
civil contempt proceeding, the respondent was ordered to prison until he complied. The
order of conditional imprisonment was reversed on appeal on the ground that there had
been no finding that the respondent was able to obey the injunction. See also Reeves v.
Crownshield, 274 N.Y. 74, 8 N.E.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1937); Shillitani v. United States, 384
U.S. 364, 371 (1966); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Inability to comply with a
judicial order is an affirmative defense in all
contempt actions, civil and criminal. This means
that the burden of proof is on the contemnor who often has only his uncorroborated
testimony to offer. There is always the possibility that he may be placed in jail on an
indefinite, coercive sentence even though there is no way he can comply with the decree.
This problem is discussed in Dobbs, supra note 2, at 266-67.
61. Imprisonment for debt is forbidden by most state constitutions although some states
permit imprisonment where the debtor is guilty of fraud, e.g., Cal. Const. art. 1, § 15. State
laws governing imprisonment for debt are followed in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C.
§2007 (1970); Fed. R. Civ. P. 64.
Exceptions to this limitation exist when courts exercising equity powers issue certain
kinds of in personam decrees ordering a defendant to pay money. Such orders, being
directions to pay and not mere declarations of a debt are within the general class of orders
enforceable by civil contempt powers. Likewise, claims based on fraud or breach of a
fiduciary duty are not considered "debts." See generally Cook, The Powers of Courts of
Equity, 15 Col. L. Rev. 37 (1915).
62. This sanction is available only if petitioner wins his action in the original suit on the
merits. But see Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929
(1966), in which an auxiliary deputy sheriff was found in contempt for disobeying an
interlocutory injunction and was ordered to pay to the attorney for the other party $200 to
cover the fee costs of the proceeding.
Compensation for losses sustained has been held to include profits "as an equitable
measure of compensation" in a patent infringement case, in effect permitting an "unjust
enrichment fine" measured by defendant's gain rather than by the plaintiff's loss. Leman v.
Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932). We see here an example of the
broader relief obtainable in equity as contrasted with law. See also Sunbeam Corp. v.
Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1958).
Although federal courts have used or permitted the compensatory fine as a civil contempt
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all civil contempt proceedings are equitable and hence discretionary
with the court, not all civil contempt proceedings are instituted and
tried as part of and between the original parties to the main equity
6
suit. 3

In the United Mine Workers case, it will be recalled that the fine
the Court imposed upon the union was of two kinds: $700,000 as
damages for the injury already done by the strike and $2,800,000 in
terrorem to secure its discontinuance. The Court agreed that, in fixing the amount of the second fine, it should consider the amount of
the defendant's financial resources and the consequent seriousness of
the burden to that particular defendant. But this second fine was
only a means of securing future compliance; it was imposed conditionally and depended upon the contemnor's future conduct.
An in terrorem fine differs from the usual conditional fine which
exacts a sanction until there is compliance; for example, where the
court starts the meter running on the fine, the contemnor will have
to pay until he complies or promises to comply. In the typical conditional sentence of imprisonment or fine, execution of the sanction
starts at the moment the court determines there is a violation. The
typical example is a civil contempt fine for alimony. H is ordered .to
pay a certain sum to W. A Claim is made that H has violated the
injunction. The court finds that there has been a violation and orders
H to remain in jail or to pay fines until he complies or promises to
comply. The in terrorem fine or imprisonment, on the other hand, is
exacted only after the court has found that H has violated the "civil
contempt order." 6 4 This order is an additional step in the prosanction only some states permit this absent statutory authority. See Schoenthal v. Schoenthai, 138 So.2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Grunberg v. Louison, 343 Mass. 729, 180
N.E.2d 802 (1962). Some states provide for compensatory contempt fines by statute, e.g.,
N.Y. Judiciary Law § 773 (McKinney 1968). In California, where contempt proceedings of
whatever nature are governed by statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § § 1209-1222 (West 1972),
there is no provision for any remedial fine, conditional or unconditional. Under the California approach, any compensatory award to the injured party depends upon an ordinary
action at law. Since civil contempts are not tried before a jury, the feeling is that civil
actions for the recovery of money should be tried in an ordinary lawsuit where a jury is
provided. See H. J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal.2d 164, 266 P.2d 5 (1954).
63. In the usual case, the moving party has obtained as in personam order as part of his
relief in an equity cause and such order has been disobeyed or disobedience is threatened by
the other party. Apart from this, disobedience to a court order can also come about in legal
(as distinct from equitable) proceedings, both civil and criminal through actions such as
refusing to answer questions during a trial, violating a pre-trial order, etc.
64. N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local Union 676, 450 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1971).
In that case, the N.L.R.B. obtained an injunction against secondary boycotts by the union.
Later, the same court found the union in contempt, again enjoined it from secondary
boycotts, and assessed a prospective fine of $5,000 if the union failed to comply in the
future with the injunction order and an additional fine of $500 per day upon such proof of
future non-compliance. The union persisted in defying the court order and, upon proof of
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cedure: the court repeats the initial injunction and spells out what
the sanction will be if there is another violation. This new step which
does no more than make explicit and quantify the threat of sanction
implicit in the initial injunction is the identifying mark of the in
terrorem sanction and has created some interesting problems for the
courts.
In Jencks v. Goforth,6" a suspended sentence of imprisonment
was revoked after defendants were found to have violated the terms
66
of a civil contempt order, the hallmark of an in terrorem sanction.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held this to be a proper civil contempt sanction.
As of the day this particular decree was entered, and it is that day
which controls, the decree was truly coercive; as to the imprisonment for ninety days, there was no single one of the defendants
unable to purge himself by obedience to the court's order. This we
believe to be literally true and further believe it to satisfy the ancient
test of "having the keys to the prison." A phrase such
6 as this must
implement the law, not control it. (Emphasis added.) 7
It is true that when the suspended sentence was imposed, defendants could have complied and thus could have completely avoided
the later revocation. But why should the ability to purge on that day
control the proper procedure to be used in a later revocation hearing?
The court seems to miss the main issue in this case. It is not a
this disobedience, the court exacted the above two fines and entered a new prospective
coercive fine for future violations considerably higher than the fines imposed before. This
illustrates the kind of gradual pressure for coercion that a court of equity is able to exert by
use of the in terrorem fine. In terrorem fines have been used by later courts primarily in a
business competition context where it can be a very effective means of securing compliance.
See Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1958); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. Sun Vacuum Stores, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1961).
65. 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953).
66. The court in Jencks reviewed the same position reiterated in Local 890, Mine, Mill &
Smelter Workers v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 58 N.M. 416, 272 P.2d 322 (1954). In that case,
the New Jersey Zinc Company brought an action against a union and associated members to
enjoin trespassing and blocking of roads. An injunction was issued and the company filed a
motion for a show cause order alleging violations had taken place. After a hearing, the trial
judge found that the defendants had violated the injunction and held them in contempt. He
fined them $4,000 each and sentenced individuals to ninety days in jail, with the proviso,
however, that half the fine and all the jail sentence would be remitted or suspended if no
further violations took place in the succeeding year. Further violations did take place within
the year and the trial court appointed three attorneys amici curiae, and issued an order
requiring defendants to show cause why the order suspending their sentences should not be
revoked for violation of the suspension order. After a hearing (conceded by all to be a civil
contempt proceeding), the trial court made an order revoking the suspension and sentencing
each of the defendants to ninety days in the County jail.
67. Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. at 636-37, 261 P.2d at 661.
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question of what day is realistic for assessing whether a decree is

coercive or not. There is no more obvious reason for looking to the
date when the suspended sentence is first imposed than there is to
look to the date when the suspension is revoked and the sentence
actually enforced. 6 8 The real issue is the proper procedure to be
followed in a hearing which is neither coercive nor remedial. Such
hearing we know from past decisions must be conducted largely
according to the rules of criminal procedure. If the criminal proce-

dures are not used, a determinate sentence, such as imprisonment for
a given number of days or a fine of a set amount, is not proper.6 9
The appeals court in Jencks was able to arrive at its decision only
after first distinguishing Gompers:
The Gompers case ... has been taken to say that a civil contempt
proceeding cannot result in imprisonment for a definite period of
time. If this is literally true, then the sentence here involved ... was
necessarily in error. The theory in support of this contention is, of
course, that the imprisonment can only be punishment for a past act
and, therefore, improper in civil contempt. The argument is logical
and the language of the Gompers case supports it. In our judgment,
however,
the Gompers case does not pass upon the question before
7 0
US.

The court then pointed out that Gompers was dealing with a civil
contempt decree in which, having found a violation of its order, the
trial court then and there sentenced individuals to fixed terms of

imprisonment. Since this could only be punishment for a past act,
the sentence was erroneous. The New Mexico appeals court turned
then to United Mine Workers for its authority.
In this decision, the Supreme Court of the United States has used a
conditional fine as a proper civil contempt sentence. Obviously, in
the event of the failure of the union to obey and purge itself, the
fine of $2,800,000 would become final and payment be enforced.
68. A number of writers have suggested that the governing date should be the date on
which the suspension was revoked, not the earlier date on which the sentence was first
suspended. See generally 67 Harv. L. Rev. 889 (1954); 39 Minn. L. Rev. 447 (1955); 1
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 220 (1954). This seems more sensible in view of the fact that, inJencks,
the violations took place and the original suspended sentence revoked long after the controversy between the company and the union had been settled. Query: as a practical matter, is
it wise to leave the punished party in a state which may seriously impair the on-going
relations of the parties?
69. Here the reasoning is from the procedure used to the type of contempt for which
certain limited sanctions are permitted. One might as well reason from the sentence meted
out that the case was civil or criminal and that the procedure should be adjusted accordingly. What is important is that a reviewing court be able to reverse when the procedure and
sentence are not compatible. See also Moskovitz, supra note 24.
70. 57 N.M. at 635-36, 261 P.2d at 655.
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At that time, the moment at which this penalty becomes final, it is

primarily punitive; no one will contend, however, that for this
reason the Supreme Court was in error in its decision and unable to
enforce the fine in the event of continued disobedience. (Emphasis
added.)7 '
Here again, the New Mexico Supreme Court misses the issue. The
issue is not enforcement of disobeyed conditional orders. Of course,
such orders need to be enforced but only after a hearing in which the
party charged with contempt, knowing that a punitive, non-coercive
sanction may be imposed, is afforded all of the usual criminal procedural safeguards-proof beyond a reasonable doubt, party charged
cannot be required to testify against himself, proof of criminal intent, and so forth.
It is submitted that the rule in Gompers that a civil contempt
proceeding cannot result in an imprisonment for a definite period of
time should hold equally for Jencks. Any proceeding to exact a
determinate penalty, be it disobedience for an order of injunction or
for an order of civil contempt, should be categorized as a criminal
contempt proceeding. What the courts in Jencks seems to forget is
that defendants in United Mine Workers were "fully informed that a
criminal contempt charge was charged" and "enjoyed during the trial
itself all the enhanced protections accorded defendants in criminal
contempt proceedings." 7 2 This was certainly not the situation in
Jencks so that United Mine Workers was not the proper case for the
court to find "full authority" for its decision. 3
Another type of problem arising from use of the civil contempt
sanction is one exemplified by the case of McComb v. Jacksonville
Paper Company.7 4 This was an injunction action relating to the
payment of wages and overtime pay to certain employees brought by
the federal Administrator against an employer under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. A decree was entered providing a formula by which
the amounts that became due were to be computed and directed the
employer to obey the provisions of the Act dealing with minimum
wages, overtime and the keeping of records.7 I By its terms it enjoined any practices which were violations of those statutory provisions. Employer took no appeal from this order. Several years later,
the Administrator instituted a contempt proceeding alleging that the
employer had not complied with the minimum wage, overtime and
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 637, 261 P.2d at 661.
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 298.
57 N.M. at 637, 261 P.2d at 661.
336 U.S. 187 (1949).
Id. at 189.
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bookkeeping provisions of the judgment and asked the District Court
to order the employer to pay unpaid statutory wages to employees.
The court found that the employer had violated the provisions of the
decree by following a plan which was not specifically enjoined. The
decree itself was couched in terms of the Act. However, both the
federal district court and U.S. Court of Appeals did not find the
employer in civil contempt because there was no "willful contempt"
since neither the law nor the injunction specifically referred to or
condemned the practices which were found to violate the decree. 6
The District Court further held that it had no power on the application of the Administrator to enforce compliance with its former
decree by ordering back wages to employees. However, Justice Douglas writing for the majority reversed the conclusion of the two lower
courts that there was no contempt because there was no disobedience to the injunction. He made the following points in his decision.
First. The absence of wilfulness does not relieve from civil contempt. Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent
the defendant did the prohibited act. The decree ... laid on them a

duty to obey specified provisions of the statute.7 7
Second. Decrees of that generality [directing the respondents to
obey certain provisions of an Act] are often necessary to prevent
further violations where a proclivity for unlawful conduct has been
shown. They took a calculated risk when under the threat of contempt they adopted measures designed to avoid the legal consequences of the Act. Accordingly where as here the aim is remedial
and not punitive there can be no complaint that the burden of any
uncertainty
in the decree is on respondent's shoulders. (Emphasis
78
added.)

Third. The measure of the court's power in civil contempt proceedings is determined by the requirements of full remedial relief. The
fact that another suit might be brought to collect payments [Section
16(b) of the Act authorizes suits by employees to recover wages and
overtime unlawfully withheld] is, of course, immaterial. The fact
that the Administrator is the complainant and that the back wages
go to the employees is not material. It is the power of the court with
which we are dealing ..

.

In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Frankfurter joined in by Justice Jackson reminded the Court that:
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

190, 191.
191.
192.
193-95.
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For violation of the command of an injunction under the Act, ...
[one] may not only be exposed to more severe civil penalties than
the Act by its own terms imposes, but made to suffer imprisonment
without benefit of jury trial. It is for such reasons that this Court has
indicated again and again that a statute cannot properly be made the
basis of contempt proceedings merely by incorporatinga reference
to its broad terms into a court order. These considerations become
increasingly important as there is increasing use of injunctions for
the enforcement of administrative orders and statutory duties.
8
(Emphasis added.) 1
and warned that "the Court is rendering a decision of far-reaching
import to the law of injunctions." Some years later in Walker v. City
of Birmingham,8 1 the Court did indeed find itself split on First
Amendment issues arising from an injunction enjoining petitioners
from certain conduct as required by a Birmingham ordinance. While
the two cases are quite dissimilar, the fact is that in both punishment
was permitted and rights lost under an injunction incorporating a
statute which would not have been issued had Justice Frankfurter's
admonition been followed.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, public attention has focused on the criminal contempt sanction, in particular, on enforcing courtroom order. While
the power of judges to apply punitive sanctions to persons who
obstruct or interfere with orderly procedures remains considerable,
severe penalties have been circumscribed by criminal procedural protections, including the right to a jury trial in all criminal contempts
involving serious penalties.
Civil contempt, by contrast, affords a contemnor only minimal
due process rights. Yet coercive punishment in certain situations can
be every bit as severe as a criminal sanction.8 2 While theoretically,
the power to coerce is assumed to be exercised on behalf of a party,
in reality any disobedience to a court is an act of disrespect which
invites a punitive response to vindicate the authority of the court.
80. Id. at 195-96.
81. 388 U.S. 307 (1967). "Petitioners in this case contend that they were convicted
under an ordinance that is unconstitutional on its face .... They further contend that the
ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to them .... The Court does not dispute these
contentions, but holds that petitioners may nonetheless be convicted and sent to jail because the patently unconstitutional ordinance was copied into an injunction-issued ex parte
without prior notice or hearing.. .-forbidding all persons having notice of the injunction to
violate the ordinance without any limitation of time." Id. at 324 (dissenting opinion).
82. E.g., indefinite imprisonment conditioned on compliance with a court order where
defiance is based on principled belief.
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The circumstances-often expressed in the observation that the
defendant "carries the key to his own prison"-has been advanced as
a reason why procedure is not of substantial concern to civil contempt defendants .... It should be recognized that, while the operation of the sanction may be prospective or conditional, the matter at
issue is not the defendant's future activity but his past conduct. A
court is without power to impose a contempt sanction unless a
violation has already occurred. Thus, a civil contempt order, like a
criminal conviction, embodies a condemnation of the defendant's
past conduct. Accordingly, a court's imposition of a contempt sanction may seem more like an original determination of the unlawfulness of a course of conduct of crucial importance to the defendant
and in which he has engaged in good faith, than like a simple compulsion to obey the law in the future.... Under such circumstances
the contention that the defendant has no substantial interest in the
procedure afforded him to dispute an assertion that his conduct
violated the injunction is unconvincing.
There is no necessary correlation between the severity of the burden imposed on the defendant by a coercive or deterrent civil contempt sanction and the cost of making the complainant whole; nor is
there any assurance that the imposition of such a sanction will inure
to the complainant's benefit. Rather the term of a coercive imprisonment or per diem fine is inherently tied to the exigencies of compelling obedience. Such an order is analogous to a penal statute in that it
attempts to evaluate the quantum of state power necessary to coerce
obedience to or deter disobedience of the law, and thus requires the
exercise of legislative judgment. It appears then that these sanctions
are designed to protect the interest of the state in vindicating its
authority as well as that of the complainant in obtaining redress.
This consideration, taken together with the possibility of stigma
which may result from the imposition of sanctions similar in form to
criminal punishment, suggests that ordinarycivil practice should not
necessarily be determinative of the procedures afforded in cases of
83
civil contempt .... (Emphasis added.)
83. Note, Procedures for Trying Contempts in the Federal Courts, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
353, 354-357 (1959). Cf. Wright, Byrne, Haake, Westbrook & Wheat, supra note 11, at
180-81. "It is apparent that the value of [abolishing the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt] depends upon the procedural safeguards which surround the proceeding. On the one hand, there is the consideration that whether the judgment of the court be
punitive or coercive in nature, the court is always relying (except in those cases involving a
compensatory fine) upon a sanction which is traditionally regarded as criminal in nature. On
the other hand, if such procedural safeguards as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt [required in criminal proceedings as compared to clear and convincing evidence
in civil contempt] and the privilege against self-incrimination are invoked, the rights of a
private litigant seeking to obtain compliance with an injunction may be seriously jeopardized .... Justice to the private litigant under these circumstances would seem to require
that his burden be no greater than in the civil proceeding which gave rise to his right in the
first instance."
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It is for these reasons that the civil contempt power may be regarded as an anomoly and as a "sleeper" in our law: providing opportunities for enforcing obedience not available to other remedies,
assuming forms as yet untried, yet limited only by the "necessity of
the case" and the "least possible power" to accomplish the desired
end.

